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China's rapid economic growth has tremendously accelerated its energy use, calling
for a more sustainable supply of scarce and nonrenewable energy. Using a firm‐
level dataset of 30 major Chinese electricity utilities from 2010 to 2014, this paper
applies a stochastic frontier analysis to determine the utilities' technical efficiency,
incorporating their operational environments related to a recent policy reform to
encourage sustainable development. Our main findings are (a) state ownership, con-
sumer density, and a chief executive officer with a science and engineering back-
ground are factors that can improve technical efficiency; (b) asset‐related subsidy
increases efficiency whereas income‐related subsidy lowers efficiency; and (c) the
five largest regional electricity generation firms exhibit above‐average efficiency
levels. These results provide evidence that supports the recent Chinese policy reform.
The findings also suggest that electricity generation efficiency, which is essential to
sustainable economic development, can be improved through performance‐based
regulation and incentives.
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The world has witnessed China's rapid economic growth in the past
decades and its continued growth in recent years. According to the
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China's gross domestic product
has increased from 41,303.03 billion RMB in 2010 to 64,397.40 billion
RMB in 2014. This economic growth has tremendously accelerated its
energy demand, calling for a more effective and sustainable use of
scarce and nonrenewable energy (Lin & Jiang, 2011). In 2014, China's
total consumption of standard coal topped the world at 4.26 billion
tons. China burns more coal (accounting for more than 50% of global
consumption) and emits more carbon and sulfur dioxide due to elec-
tricity generation than any other country (Boden, Marland, & Andres,
2010; Smith et al., 2011; BP, 2013).
Meanwhile, China is facing substantial risk of a shortage in electric-
ity supply that may lead to considerable economic cost and hinder sus-
tainable economic growth (Ou, Huang, & Yao, 2016). Policymakers areEnvironment wileyonliurged to take serious actions to ensure electricity supply. Improving
efficiency on the supply side is an essential step toward sustainable
economic development (Ma, Shi, & Chou, 2016). Thus, along with
encouraging the development of renewable energy sources, the Chi-
nese government has been working to introduce competition on the
supply side and encourage energy savings on the demand side and
incentivizing electricity utilities to advance their technologies (Ma &
Zhao, 2015). With the goal to encourage utilities to invest in research
and development as well as equipment upgrades, the recent policy
reform in China has two distinct features. First, rather than assisting
in the development of all electricity generation utilities, the Chinese
government places emphasis on large utilities. Second, the govern-
ment specifically defined two types of subsidies based on where the
subsidy will be used: asset investment or income compensation (Wang
& Lin, 2017).
In this paper, we apply a stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to exam-
ine the performance of the Chinese electricity generation utilities,Sustainable Development. 2019;27:770–780.nelibrary.com/journal/sd
1A detailed description of the functions of the NEA is available on the National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC)'s website at ndrc.gov.cn.
LI ET AL. 771controlling for the operational environments that reflect the current
policy. The SFA model allows us to examine a firm's efficiency by
including a noise (vit) and production inefficiency (uit) as error terms.
Efficiency is defined as the firm's actual output relative to the output
that could have been produced with the same input vector had the
firm been fully efficient. Operational environments related to the cur-
rent policy are incorporated to explore the effect of the policy reform
on electricity generation.
Government subsidies crucially affect the performance of public
utility sectors such as electricity, natural gas, and water. Firms can
use the subsidies to replace aging equipment which will improve the
firms' production efficiency. Firms can also use the subsidies to com-
pensate for heavy labor and production costs which will necessarily
reduce both their budget and incentives to improve efficiency. Previ-
ous research has focused on examining the overall impact of govern-
ment subsidies on firms' production efficiency. Due to the
contradicting effects of the two subsidies, the impacts of the subsidies
may offset each other, leading to an underestimation of the influence
of each individual subsidy. Even though the literature has recognized
the existence of heterogeneity in subsidies and their corresponding
opposing impact, to our best knowledge, there has yet to be any
empirical work that explicitly investigates the differential effects of
government subsidies on firms' performance.
The recent Chinese policy reform on government subsidies pro-
vides us an opportunity to directly analyze the two contradicting
effects of government subsidies. The current Chinese policy reform
makes a clear distinction between asset‐related subsidy and income‐
related subsidy: The former can only be spent on equipment, plant,
and property whereas the latter can be spent on anything other than
long‐term assets. The government can easily monitor and track the
use of asset‐related subsidies but may not be able to do so for
income‐related subsidies. Under strict supervision, electricity utilities
must spend the asset‐related subsidies on plants, equipment, and net-
work upgrades, which will lead to better operational performance and
will improve the firm's technical efficiency. Without serious monitor-
ing, electricity utilities may use the income‐related subsidies to com-
pensate for their loss, which will reduce their incentives to lower
costs and improve production efficiency.
Using this unique feature in the reform policy, we find that although
asset‐related subsidy improves efficiency, income‐related subsidy may
pose an adverse effect on efficiency. By distinguishing the impacts from
the two government subsidies, our paper contributes to the literature
by providing sound empirical evidence that confirm the underlying
mechanism of government subsidies predicted in the theory. Our find-
ings also draw important implications to the optimal subsidy design.
Simply distributing subsidies to electricity utilities is unlikely to achieve
a long‐term goal of technology advancement. Instead, the government
and regulators may consider issuing specific guidelines on how the sub-
sidies will be used. Additionally, certain policies may be necessary to
enhance the transparency in the use of subsidy by the utilities. Only
when the subsidy is spent on replace aging equipment, research and
development and other forms of technology advancement will there
be long‐term improvement in production efficiency.The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
market structure of the electricity generation sector in China and sum-
marizes the recent policy reform of sustainable development in the
Chinese electricity sector. Section 3 provides a review of the literature
on the efficiency of electricity generation. Section 4 introduces the
SFA model, and Section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6
concludes the paper and draws policy implications on efficiency
improvement and sustainable development.2 | ELECTRICITY GENERATION REFORM IN
CHINA
In China, the National Energy Administration founded in 2013 over-
sees the development and reforms of the entire energy sector.1 The
Chinese electricity generation sector faces increasing problems of
aging facilities, limited capacity, and low skill level of labor due to lack
of education and professional training. Consequently, to ensure long‐
term electricity supply, there is a strong and urgent need for technol-
ogy advancement in the energy generation sector.
The State Power Corporation held monopoly power in both elec-
tricity generation and electricity distribution sectors in China prior to
2002, at which time the State Council launched a restructuring pro-
gram to dismantle the State Power Corporation into a number of
regional electricity utilities (Lam & Shiu, 2004; Zeng, Yang, Wang, &
Sun, 2016). This decentralization aimed to introduce competition in
the electricity sector. The restructuring program, however, did not
result in perfect competition. Since then, five regional electricity gen-
eration companies (Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian, and State
Power Investment Corporation) grew and began to dominate the elec-
tricity generation market. Meanwhile, two power grid operators, the
State Grid Corporation of China and the China Southern Power Grid,
gradually became the dominant firms in the electricity distribution sec-
tor. Currently, there are six regional grids in China, of which five are
managed by the State Grid Corporation of China (north, northeast,
east, central, and northwest), and an independent grid (south) is man-
aged by the China Southern Power Grid.
Ongoing reforms intend to improve efficiency by separating power
plants from power supply grids and privatizing a significant number of
state‐owned properties. Most recently, during China's 11th five‐year
plan between 2006 and 2010, the government launched a new policy:
Promote Large and Close Small (Zhang, Kong, Choi, & Zhou, 2014). This
policy aims to shut down all the remaining small regional electricity
utilities and encourage the development of the five largest electricity
generation firms. It is believed that economies of scale can improve
generation efficiency while strengthening competition among the five
utilities.
Although competition was introduced to the electricity generation
sector, the Chinese government maintains some control. Government
intervention and price regulation suppress the price of electricity to
below the cost of operation. To maintain the operation of the utility
772 LI ET AL.plants and ensure electricity supply, the Chinese government must
provide large subsidies to the electricity generation utilities. On Febru-
ary 15, 2006, the Ministry of Finance issued the No. 16 Accounting
Standards for Enterprises which became effective on January 1,
2007. This document defines two types of government subsidies:
asset‐related subsidy and income‐related subsidy. The former can be
used by a qualified electricity utility to purchase, acquire, or construct
long‐term assets, such as equipment and plants; the latter can be used
for almost any other expense. Both types of subsidies must be pub-
lished in the recipient's financial report. With this new standard, the
Chinese government not only determines the amount of subsidy dis-
tributed to the electricity utilities but also imposes restrictions on
how the subsidy can be used.3 | LITERATURE REVIEW
There has been extensive research on electricity utility efficiency.
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of incorporating oper-
ational environments that may affect utilities' performance (Sueyoshi
& Goto, 2011; Sueyoshi, Goto, & Ueno, 2010; Yang & Pollitt, 2009,
2010). Most of these studies employ either a data envelopment anal-
ysis (DEA) or a SFA. DEA, a nonparametric method, applies linear pro-
gramming to determine the efficiency of firms without assuming a
functional form of the production function. The standard DEA does
not consider operational or environmental factors when determining
efficiency. Though other advanced methods can be added to a stan-
dard DEA to incorporate these factors, it may also introduce noise
to the model. SFA, a parametric method, applies statistical analysis
to examine efficiency while controlling for environmental factors.
However, SFA assumes functional forms for the production function
and the cost function. There are advantages and disadvantages for
both DEA and SFA, and neither method is strictly preferred over the
other.2
Table 1 presents a summary of the studies on energy generation
efficiency in China. The amount of electric power generated is gener-
ally used as the output variable whereas capital, labor, and fuel con-
sumption are used as input variables (Bi, Song, Zhou, & Liang, 2014;
Fallahi, Ebrahimi, & Ghaderi, 2011; Lam & Shiu, 2001, 2004; Ma &
Zhao, 2015; Yang & Pollitt, 2009, 2010; Zhang et al., 2014; Zhang &
Choi, 2013; Zhao & Ma, 2013; Zhou, Xing, Fang, Liang, & Xu, 2013).
Some studies also include the utility's installed capacity as an input
(Bi et al., 2014; Fallahi et al., 2011; Ma & Zhao, 2015; Yang & Pollitt,
2009, 2010). Additionally, some papers use undesirable output, such
as the emissions of SO2, NOX, and CO2, as output variables to address
the issue of pollution (Bi et al., 2014; Yang & Pollitt, 2009, 2010;
Zhang & Choi, 2013; Zhou et al., 2013).
Most studies conduct a standard DEA to analyze firms' efficiency
without incorporating environmental factors (Bi et al., 2014; Fallahi
et al., 2011; Zhang & Choi, 2013). Some works apply more advanced
regression methods to a standard DEA to account for environmental
factors (Lam & Shiu, 2001, 2004; Zhao & Ma, 2013; Zhou et al.,2See Coelli et al. (2005) for a detailed comparison of DEA and SFA.2013). There are also studies that apply an SFA to incorporate opera-
tional environments such as innovation capability, ownership, plant
size, location, and foreign direct investment to estimate efficiency
(Chen, Barros, & Borges, 2015; Ma & Zhao, 2015). Because the focus
of our paper is to examine the impact of the recent policy reform on
the efficiency of electricity generation in China which is reflected in
the environmental factors, we believe that SFA is the most appropri-
ate method to evaluate firms' performance due to its ability to take
into account environmental factors.
Existing research has explored the overall impact of government
subsidies on electricity production using aggregate measures of gov-
ernment subsidies. They have found mixed results. Some studies find
a positive impact of government subsidy on electricity production as
the subsidy provides financial support to the firms (Alavi, 1994; China
Electricity Council, 2016; Jin, Shang, & Xu, 2018; Nicolini & Tavoni,
2017). Some studies find that government subsidy may decrease pro-
duction efficiency because firms can use the subsidies to pay for the
high cost of production rather than invest in research and develop-
ment (Rezitis, Tsiboukas, & Tsoukalas, 2003; Phillips, 2013; Dhital
et al., 2016). There are also studies that find a more complicated rela-
tionship between government subsidy and utilities' technical effi-
ciency. Marques, Berg, and Yane (2014) finds that the impact of
government subsidy on the efficiency of water utilities in Japan
depends on the ratio between subsidy and total operating expense.
Yu, Guo, Le‐Nguyen, Barnes, and Zhang (2016) also suggest that
the influence of government subsidy on the R&D incentives in the
Chinese renewable energy sector may change as the size of the sub-
sidy changes.
Government subsidy to public utilities may be spent in different
ways. Where and how the money is spent may affect the utilities'
long‐term production efficiency. In the existing literature, to the best
of our knowledge, only two papers (Andor & Voss, 2016; Reichenbach
& Requate, 2012) recognize the potentially different effects of gov-
ernment subsidies and discuss the implications of distinguishing subsi-
dies. They examine theoretically the impact of capacity subsidy and
generation subsidy on the externalities in the electricity markets. We
have yet to find any studies that analyze the impact of government
subsidies on utilities' production efficiency by distinguishing the subsi-
dies by their types or usages. The current Chinese policy explicitly
defines subsidy by its usage which allows us to empirically explore
the underlying relationship between the two types of government
subsidies (asset‐related subsidy and income‐related subsidy) and firms'
technical efficiency.
Moreover, due to data limitation, there are very few studies on the
efficiency of electricity generation in China using firm‐level data.Wind,
a financial information service company, collects firm‐level operation
and financial data of 21 major industries in China from the National
Bureau of Statistics, the National Development and Reform Commis-
sion, the Ministry of Commerce, the General Administration of Cus-
toms, and other industry associations. Its economic database
contains recent financial and market information on China's capital
market. With firm‐level data, rather than city‐level or province‐level
data that are commonly used in existing studies, this paper contributes
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TABLE 2 Environmental variables Zit
774 LI ET AL.to the literature by providing more accurate estimates of the role of
the different government subsidies on technical efficiency.
Variable Description Definition
asubr Percentage of asset‐related
subsidy
Sum of asset‐related
subsidies divided by the
total revenue of the utility
(%)
isubr Percentage of income‐related
subsidy
Sum of income‐related
subsidies divided by the
total revenue of the utility
(%)
statown Percentage of state‐owned
stock
Ratio of state‐owned stock to
the total stock (%)
cuscon Consumer concentration Percentage of the total sales
revenue from the utility's
five largest consumers (%)
techCEO Education background of the
chief executive officer
(CEO) of the utility
techCEO = 1 if the CEO
majored in science or
engineering; techCEO = 0
otherwise
TABLE 3 Summary statistics
Variable Mean
Standard
deviation Min Max
Production function
Electric power (Y) 564.85 703.43 4.24 3,174.81
Number of staff (L) 8340.14 9065.31 491.00 37,737.00
Fixed asset (FA) 50552.95 64644.33 1011.83 249,607.84
Installed capacity (IC) 1231.45 1500.14 11.00 7,048.00
Technical inefficiency
effect
asubr 0.07 0.10 0.00 0.55
isubr 0.95 1.85 0.00 8.80
statown 57.51 16.10 14.43 92.19
cuscon 75.05 24.09 12.61 100.00
techCEO 0.72 0.45 0 14 | MODEL
4.1 | Data description
The main source of data is the annual financial reports of individual
electricity utilities available at the Wind‐Economics Database. We use
a pooled unbalanced panel sample consisting of 30 major electricity
generation utilities (105 observations) between 2009 and 2013.3
4.2 | Production function model description
Our study applies an SFA to estimate the production efficiency of
electricity utilities in China, incorporating operational and regulatory
factors. The SFA incorporates both random noises (vit) and the differ-
ences in systematic inefficiency (uit) between samples which allows a
comparison of the performances of the electricity utilities.
We use a one‐step SFA model to measure inefficiency as proposed
by Battese and Coelli (1995). The model was estimated using Frontier
4.1, a program written by Professor Tim Coelli. The Cobb–Douglas
stochastic frontier production function is specified as follows:
lnYit ¼ β0 þ β1 ln Litð Þ þ β2 ln FAitð Þ þ β3 ln ICitð Þ þ vit − uit; (1)
where each firm is indexed with a subscript i (i = 1, … , I) and each year
is indexed with a subscript t (t = 1, … , T). Yit is the total amount of
electric power generated by firm i in year t in million kilowatt hour.
Lit denotes the number of staff, and FAit is the total fixed asset
reported in the annual balance sheet in million RMB. ICit denotes the
installed capacity which is defined as the maximum rated output of a
generator, prime mover, or other electric power production equipment
under specific conditions designated by the manufacturer in
10,000 kw. vit is an error term which is assumed to be independently
and identically distributed with normal distribution N (0, σ2). The
technical inefficiency term uit, consisting of nonnegative random vari-
ables, is subtracted because inefficiency lowers output. uit is assumed
to be independent of vit and truncated at zero with normal distribution
N(Zit, σ
2), where Zit is a vector of independent variables associated
with production inefficiency of the electricity utilities over time. The
list of independent variables and their descriptions are available in
Table 2.
The relationship between uit and Zit is defined by the following
technical inefficiency effects specification:
uit ¼ F Zitð Þ
¼ δ0 þ δ1 asubritð Þ þ δ2 isubritð Þ þ δ3 statownitð Þ þ δ4 cusconitð Þ
þ δ5 techCEOitð Þ þ wit; (2)
where wit is an independently and identically distributed random vari-
able that follows a truncated normal distribution, N (0, σ2; Coelli,3Our sample is an unbalanced panel due to the lack of information on some years.1996; Battese & Coelli, 1995). Among the environmental variables
Zit, the main explanatory variables are the percentage of asset‐related
subsidy (asubrit) and the percentage of income‐related subsidy (isubrit).
The control variables include the percentage of state‐owned stock
(statownit), consumer concentration (cusconit), and the education back-
ground of the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the utility (techCEOit).
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in
Equations 1 and 2.
This study applies the maximum likelihood estimation to estimate
the parameters in the production function (Equation 1) and technical
inefficiency effect (Equation 2) simultaneously.
Following Coelli, Rao, O'Donnell, and Battese (2005), technical
efficiency of production for a utility i in year t is defined as follows:
TEit ¼ e−uit : (3)Observations 105
TABLE 5 Stochastic frontier analysis estimation results of produc-
tion function and technical inefficiency
Variable Estimated coefficient
LI ET AL. 775That is, technical efficiency is defined as the utility's maximum produc-
tion given a fixed level of inputs. This efficiency score is measured on
a scale between 0 and 1. A score closer to 1 is considered more
efficient.
Production function
Intercept (β0) −2.86***
(−6.14)
Log (number of staff) 0.22***
(4.22)
Log (fixed assets) 0.55***
(5.14)
Log (installed capacity) 0.23*
(1.91)
Technical Inefficiency
Intercept (δ0) 3.83***
(8.57)
asubr −2.54***
(−3.53)
isubr 0.16***
(3.89)
statown −0.03***
(−4.66)
cuscon −0.03***5 | ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 | Ordinary least squares estimation
In a stochastic frontier model, the error is given by vit − uit. If technical
inefficiency uit is not a part of the error term, ordinary least squares
(OLS) will be sufficient to produce consistent estimates. An OLS esti-
mation is performed as the benchmark analysis and the results are pre-
sented in Table 4.
The OLS benchmark analysis suggests that labor, fixed assets, and
installed capacity are all positive factors that lead to higher production.
Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed a gamma value γ ¼ σu
2
σ2
to test the
consistency of OLS estimates. The null hypothesis is that γ = 0, that is,
technical inefficiency is not present in the error term. Our estimated γ
is 0.44, and it is statistically different from zero with a t‐statistics of
1.75; thus, at least some variation of the error term is due to ineffi-
ciency. Because OLS will not produce consistent estimates, we turn
our attention to SFA estimation.(−6.59)
techCEO −0.27*
(−1.70)
Observations 105
Note. t‐statistics are provided in parentheses. Cross section = 30.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.5.2 | SFA estimation
The main estimation results using an SFA are shown in Table 5. The
estimated coefficients of the control variables have the expected pos-
itive signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels. For
instance, a 1% increase in the number of staff leads to about 0.22%
increase in the electricity output whereas a 1% increase in installed
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
TABLE 4 Ordinary least squares estimation results of production
function
Variable Estimated coefficient
Intercept (β0) −2.34***
(−4.99)
Log (number of staff) 0.04
(0.68)
Log (fixed assets) 0.22**
(2.31)
Log (installed capacity) 0.83***
(10.38)
R2 0.18
Observations 105
Note. t‐statistics are provided in parentheses.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.capacity increases the total electricity output by about 0.23%. More-
over, state ownership, consumer concentration, and the CEO's engi-
neering education all reduce technical inefficiency and increase
technical efficiency.
We find that asset‐related subsidy lowers technical inefficiency
(i.e., improves efficiency), but income‐related subsidy increases techni-
cal inefficiency (i.e., decreases efficiency), and income‐related subsi-
dies can be used to compensate for the utilities' loss and can be
deducted from their expense reports. Our estimated results provide
empirical evidence that support the theoretical predictions. Because
asset‐related subsidies can only be used to acquire or construct
long‐term assets and especially under government supervision and
monitoring, the electricity utilities would have to spend this money
on plants, equipment, and network upgrades. Their operational perfor-
mance, therefore, will improve.4 On the other hand, there is no strict4Larger plants and newer equipment have been found to improve production efficiency. For
example, Zhang et al. (2014) find that larger plant size leads to higher fossil fuel generation
efficiency.
776 LI ET AL.restriction on where the income‐related subsidy can be spent. Utilities
can therefore use this money to compensate for their loss and deduct
them from their expense reports. This not only takes away the finan-
cial opportunity for the utilities to advance technology but also
reduces their incentive to do so.
Moreover, the estimated coefficient on the percentage of state‐
owned share (statown) is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level, implying that electricity generation utilities with a higher per-
centage of state‐owned capital perform more efficiently. This result
contradicts with Sarıca and Or (2007). They find that the performance
efficiency of the state‐owned thermal plants is significantly lower than
their private counterparts in the Turkish power generation industry
due to the higher operational costs of the state‐owned plants. In China,
however, due to the extremely large demand for electricity, electricity
utilities rely heavily on investment on fixed assets, network mainte-
nance, and management training. With government funding on profes-
sional staff, advanced administration, and more advanced techniques,
firms with a larger state share will have an operational advantage. In
fact, the top five power generation firms, Huaneng, Datang, Huadian,
Guodian, and State Power Investment Corporation, are almost entirely
state owned. Their operation performances are better than those that
are mainly owned by private parties. The estimated coefficient on con-
sumer concentration is negative and statistically significant. The elec-
tricity utilities with higher consumer density have a lower inefficiency
level. This finding is consistent with Farsi and Filippini (2009), which
suggest that higher consumer density can lower production costs. We
also test the importance of the education background of a firm's CEO.
In the Chinese electricity sector, most CEOs have a science, engineer-
ing, economics, or political science degree. Our result suggests that a
CEOwith a science or engineering background can improve the utility's
technical efficiency. This is likely because those with a background in
science or engineering pay more attention to research and develop-
ment, reconstruction of plants, and replacement of aging equipment
whereas those with social science backgrounds may focus on business
strategies and administration. Although traditionally those with busi-
ness or social science backgrounds are better suited for the role of
CEOs, in the current structure of the electricity sector in China thatrelies heavily on technological advancement, scientists and engineers
may be better leaders for the electricity utilities.
This study further explores the distribution of the estimated effi-
ciency scores of the electricity utilities and calculates the percentage
of total electric power generated based on the utility's efficiency
score. Figure 1 includes both the frequency of utilities with different
ranges of efficiency scores and the percentage of electricity generated
by utilities with the associated efficiency scores. Our estimated effi-
ciency score ranges from 0.08 (least efficient) to 0.98 (most efficient),
suggesting a large gap in the production efficiency among the electric-
ity utilities. Additionally, the least efficient utility could reduce input
usage by an astonishing 92%. The efficiency score is averaged at
0.70 which means that about 30% of the costs can be reduced with-
out decreasing output should the utility achieve perfect efficiency.
About 61% of the utilities have an efficiency score above 0.70, gener-
ating 77.23% of the total electric power. Thus, most electricity in
China is generated by utilities with an above‐average efficiency level.
Table 6 summarizes the output and estimated efficiency score by
year, and Table 7 presents the summary statistics of firm‐level installed
capacity. The highest average output appears in 2012 at 60.91 bil-
lion kWh. This is likely due to the change in installed capacity (see
Table 7). Except from 2010 to 2011, the growth of installed capacity
affects the growth of predicted output positively which is consistent
with the finding in the Chinese Electricity Sector Report from the China
Electricity Council (2016). They show a strong correlation between
installed capacity and the output level of electricity generation.
In Table 8, we compare the input factors, output factor, and effi-
ciency scores between the top five electricity generation utilities and
the rest of the utilities. The top five utilities are better equipped
with labor, fixed assets, and installed capacity. Though the mean
efficiency score of the top five utilities is statistically significantly
higher than that of the rest utilities with a t‐statistics of 1.69, the
size of this difference is not substantial. Although this finding does
confirm that the Chinese government is providing more political
and financial support to large utilities, it also suggests that more
incentives need to be provided for the top five utilities to further
improve their production efficiency.FIGURE 1 Distribution of efficiency scores
and outputs
TABLE 6 Predicted output and efficiency scores
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max
2010
Output 504.34 552.37 32.05 1,784.78
Efficiency score 0.76 0.17 0.38 0.97
2011
Output 514.12 592.32 9.29 2,037.16
Efficiency score 0.74 0.21 0.19 0.96
2012
Output 609.13 788.06 5.14 3,024.33
Efficiency score 0.7 0.27 0.08 0.96
2013
Output 576.69 758.51 4.24 3,174.81
Efficiency score 0.69 0.28 0.08 0.97
2014
Output 589.76 776.69 4.37 2,943.88
Efficiency score 0.66 0.27 0.15 0.98
2010–2014
Output 564.85 703.43 4.24 3,174.81
Efficiency score 0.7 0.25 0.08 0.98
TABLE 7 Output and installed capacity
Year
Output Installed capacity
Total Growth rate (%) Total Growth rate (%)
2010 504.3 — 1113.64 —
2011 514.1 1.94 1066.09 −4.27
2012 609.1 18.48 1295.84 21.55
2013 576.7 −5.33 1259.43 −2.81
2014 589.8 2.27 1342.39 6.59
TABLE 8 Comparison between top five and the other utilities
Top five utilities Other utilities
Inputs
Labor 14,404.23 4,134.40
Fixed asset 76,852.62 32,312.85
Installed capacity 1,934.09 744.14
Output
Electricity generation 908.12 326.77
Efficiency score 0.75 0.67
Note. This table reports the means of the variables.
TABLE 9 Stochastic frontier analysis estimation results of produc-
tion function with time‐varying efficiency
Variable Estimated coefficient
Production function
Intercept (β0) −0.85
(−1.30)
Log (number of staff) 0.00
(0.05)
Log (fixed assets) 0.37***
(4.31)
Log (installed capacity) 0.58***
(5.79)
Testing time‐varying efficiency
eta (η) −0.00
(−0.29)
Observations 105
Note. t‐statistics are provided in parentheses. Cross section = 30.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
LI ET AL. 7775.3 | Robustness check: Alternative SFA estimations
Technical efficiency levels may change systematically over time. Given
that we have panel data, we can incorporate this potential dynamicfeature of efficiency. In this subsection, we consider two alternative
models that incorporate a time effect.
We first consider a time‐varying inefficiency SFA proposed by
Battese and Coelli (1992). The technical inefficiency term u′it is
assumed to be
u′it ¼ uieη t−Tð Þ; (4)
where ui are random variables which have truncated normal distribu-
tion, t indicates the current year of observation, T is the entire sample
period, and η is a time‐related parameter.
In this specification, the null hypothesis is that η = 0, that is, tech-
nical inefficiency is independent of time after controlling. Thus, the
estimated value of η is used to determine whether we should apply
a time‐invariant or a time‐varying efficiency model.
We estimate this time‐varying efficiency model using the same
independent variables in Equations 1 and 2. The estimated results
are presented in Table 9. The estimated value of η is −0.0033, and it
is not statistically different from zero with a t‐statistics equal to
−0.2948. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that technical
inefficiency is independent of time. In other words, we do not have
sound evidence that the technical efficiency of the utilities is changing
over time.
We further consider adding year dummies to Equation 2 to control
for unobserved time effect. Table 10 presents the estimation results
with year dummies. None of the estimated coefficients on the year
dummies is statistically significant. The coefficients on the input vari-
ables and the environmental variables remain similar to those in
Table 5.
TABLE 10 Stochastic frontier analysis estimation results of produc-
tion function and technical inefficiency with year dummies
Variable Estimated coefficient
Production function
Intercept (β0) −2.76***
(−5.66)
Log (number of staff) 0.20***
(3.46)
Log (fixed assets) 0.55***
(5.19)
Log (installed capacity) 0.24**
(1.99)
Technical inefficiency
Intercept (δ0) 3.80***
(7.31)
asubr −2.69***
(−3.31)
isubr 0.16***
(3.53)
statown −0.03***
(−4.31)
cuscon −0.03***
(−5.96)
techCEO −0.29*
(−1.78)
Year = 2009 0.21
(0.84)
Year = 2010 0.16
(0.77)
Year = 2011 −0.01
(−0.05)
Year = 2012 0.02
(0.09)
Observations 105
Note. t‐statistics are provided in parentheses. Cross section = 30.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
778 LI ET AL.The two exercises presented above suggest that the technical
efficiency of the utilities is not systematically changing over time.
They also confirm the robustness of our main results.6 | CONCLUSION
Sustainable electricity generation is a cornerstone for economic devel-
opment in China. Electricity generation can only be sustained if effi-
ciency is improved. In this study, using a unique firm‐level datasetfrom 2010 to 2014, we examine the electricity utilities' production
efficiency accounting for their operational environment under the
recent policy reform. Our results suggest that there is a large disparity
among the Chinese electricity utilities in production efficiency, ranging
from an efficiency score of 0.08 to an efficiency score of 0.98. Effi-
ciency can be substantially improved to ensure sustainable develop-
ment if an appropriate regulatory framework that incorporates
performance benchmarking into incentives is provided.
Our results confirm that more staffing, larger fixed assets, and
increased installed capacity can all raise output levels. Therefore, bet-
ter institutional control in the form of increasing installed capacities as
well as the number of staffs and fixed assets should be imposed. In
addition, we find that environmental factors, including the percentage
of state‐owned assets, consumer density, and a science and engineer-
ing education of a firm's CEO are crucial factors that can lead to higher
technical efficiency. More importantly, our results suggest that gov-
ernment subsidy can improve efficiency only if the subsidy is used
to replace aging equipment to advance technology. Subsidy may
indeed reduce efficiency if it increases the utility's dependence on
government's financial support.
The Chinese government promotes larger utilities and plans to shut
down smaller ones. We show that the largest five regional power gen-
eration companies, Huaneng, Datang, Huadian, Guodian, and State
Power Investment Corporation, do exhibit a higher level of technical
efficiency. Unfortunately, compared with their significant advantage
in labor, fixed asset, and installed capacity, their lead in efficiency
appears to be negligible. Other than input investment, technical effi-
ciency advancement is more urgent as it leads to improvement in
the performance in operation and administration of utilities.
China has achieved great success in economic development; how-
ever, the increasing risks in the scarcity in electricity could hinder sus-
tainable development. The issue of electricity supply has led to several
recent policy reforms and is expected to continue to be the center of
policy considerations. From a research perspective, this study explores
China's electricity generation sector by depicting a clear, albeit prelimi-
nary, picture of the performance of electricity utilities and provides
important policy implications. This study aims to raise the policymakers'
awareness of possible changes in operational and institutional environ-
ments that can eventually lead to greater efficiency and more sustain-
able supply. A more comprehensive dataset with performance‐based
incentives could help identify other areas of improvement.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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